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BOOK REVIEWS
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE.
By Jeffrey O'Connell. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
1971. Pp. xiii, 253. $8.50.
For a number of years Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has investigated
and criticized the traditional methods used to compensate traffic accident
victims. As coauthor with Professor Robert Keeton of Basic Protection
for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile In-
surance,' a book containing a proposal popularly called the Keeton-
O'Connell plan, O'Connell has played a major role in geperating
interest in reform and in developing proposals to achieve it. In his
latest book, The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault In-
surance,2 O'Connell abandons his roles as investigator, critic and designer
and adopts those of advocate and polemicist. He carries his case to
the general public in an effort to stimulate support for the reform
for which he long has labored.3 Unfortunately, O'Connell's efforts as
polemicist and advocate do not achieve the performance level he has
consistently attained in his other roles. The Injury Industry is a super-
ficial and misleading work, one which does credit neither to the man
nor to the cause he serves.
The book's title suggests both the superficiality and misleading
nature of its contents. O'Connell has written an expos6 of what he
labels "the injury industry." The "industry" to which he refers consists
of the major opponents of no fault insurance reform: insurance com-
panies and organized bar groups. The author's thesis is simple. Since
the fault system operates unfairly and inefficiently, it does a poor job of
compensating victims of motor vehicle accidents. O'Connell argues that
no fault insurance would provide better and fairer compensation more
efficiently than does the fault system. He accuses the injury industry of
having a financial stake in retaining the fault system and, therefore, he
is suspect of its opposition to no fault reform.' Insofar as he attacks the
1. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIM: A.
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON
& O'CONNELL].
2. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE INJURY INDUSTRY].
3. See, e.g., id. at 1-8.
4. See, e.g., id. at 37-38.
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make clear, however, that reallocating costs among existing compensatory
devices may not alter significantly the total costs.2" Auto insurance
premiums may be reduced, but the premium costs for maintenance of other
funds will rise. The expansion of health, accident or disability benefits
provided by a federal program will inevitably require a higher F.I.C.A.
tax. Any meaningful long-range cost reduction can be achieved only
through reducing the incidence and severity of accidents. -' It is not a
matter of devising a new accounting system.
No fault inurance, in short, is mislabeled a remedy for what ails our
compensation system. It should more properly be labeled an instrument,
a device for making our claims adjustment apparatus potentially more
economical and efficient. When so viewed, no fault insurance becomes
an attractive part of a larger reform package. That larger package,
however, should include proposals directed toward safer vehicles, better
roads, alternative forms of transport, modern licensing procedures, up-
to-date enforcement methods for moving traffic violations and a system
for regulating insurance rates and insurer cancellation and claims ad-
justing practices.22 Such a package might properly be labeled a remedy.
The problem with the debate over no fault insurance is the super-
ficiality of the dispute. I suspect that many citizens realize something is
wrong with the fault system. I further suspect they will support correc-
tives. However, I doubt that The Injury Industry and the Remedy of
No-Fault Insurance will assist the public in an analysis of the problems
of motor vehicle transport policies for this nation. If recalled from limbo
at all, it will be as the expos6 that failed-no mean feat in an era of
activist reforms and widespread exposure of the alleged evils of in-
stitutions.
PHILIP C. THORPEt
20. O'Connell discusses coverage duplications. Id. at 97-105. He does not discuss
the impact on costs of eliminating coverage duplications by shifting certain costs to
other forms of insurance.
21. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 26-31, 68-129; Thorpe, supra note 15, at
316-18.
22. See generally Thorpe, supra note 15.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
The ideal system of traffic victim reparations would provide full
compensation to each injured motorist and pedestrian at the lowest
possible cost to society and its individual driving members. In The
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Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault Insurance,1 Professor
Jeffrey O'Connell contends that our present system, based upon the tort
principle of fault, fails miserably to meet any of the criteria.
"Injury industry" aptly describes the monstrosity which so poorly
apportions the funds available to compensate the victims of traffic
accidents who annually suffer over five billion dollars of "compensable
economic loss." The author cites the recent Department of Transporta-
tion study2 which concluded that approximately 45 per cent of those
seriously injured in traffic accidents received no payment at all from
automobile liability insurance and that only fifteen per cent of the total
out-of-pocket losses were paid from that source. Moreover, the distribu-
tion of funds actually paid appears indefensible--55 per cent of all
victims are unpaid, small claims are generally overpaid and the typical
claimant with substantial economic loss is grossly underpaid. O'Connell
further points out that the average interval between the time of the claim
and its payment is nearly sixteen months-an intolerable burden in
cases of substantial economic loss. However, the most damning aspect
of the system is the enormous expense of its operation. No less than 56
cents of every dollar of insurance premium is consumed by administrative
and legal costs, leaving only 44 cents for compensating the traffic victim.
This overhead rate compares with a cost of three cents for Social
Security, seven cents for Blue Cross and seventeen cents for health and
accident plans.' In none of these other programs is "fault" or the
extent of "pain and suffering" in controversy. Professor O'Connell is
quick to remind us that these other insurance programs are largely
successful because of the limited role which lawyers play in them.
The shortcomings of the present tort system ought to be exposed so
as to have a great impact and to create provocation in the public. The
Injury Industry certainly serves such a purpose. However, Professor
O'Connell jeopardizes this objective by his resort to broad categoriza-
tions and inflammatory argument.
His criticism of the present system includes indictments of the
medical profession, the trial bar and the automobile insurance industry.
The author speaks of the familiar "whore" of the medical society (as
if there were one on every corner) who is prepared to offer expert
1. J. O'CoNNELL, THE INiURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No FAULT
INSURANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE INJURY INDUSTRY].
2. DEP'T OF TRANSPORATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
INJURES, REPORT OF THE WESTAT RESEARCH CORPORATI N (1970).
3. THE INUjRY INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 29.
4. Id. at 17.
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testimony for a price.' The plaintiff's attorney is portrayed as an
"ambulance chaser," whose contingent fee contracts are equated with
Shylock's demand in a chapter entitled "A Pound of Flesh."5 The
defense bar is suspect for its "indirect fondness"6 of the unconscionable
fees commanded by its opponents since these fees promote litigation
business for insurance company lawyers. It is even suggested that the
trial bar is singularly responsible for the perpetuation of the system:
Thus, despite the personal antagonism between the plaintiffs'
and the insurance lawyers, they rally together in an unholy
alliance to preserve the fault system that serves them both so
well.7
Finally, the automobile insurance industry is indicted for its callous
and capricious attitude toward the settlement of just claims and its
"ostrich-like" 8 unwillingness to consider new alternatives.9
With his denunciation of the corrupt system and the puffing of his
remedy, Professor O'Connell resembles a sophisticated medicine show-
man, calling upon testimonials in support of his claims more for the
impact of their rhetoric than for their soundness of reason. For example,
O'Connell uses frequent, but sometimes not very relevant, quotations
from "insurance executives" and "prominent attorneys." He includes a
lengthy quotation from a law review note by law student Richard M.
Nixon,"0 apparently less for its mastery of expression than for the
present prominence of its author. The recent cinema comedy "The
Fortune Cookie" is submitted as containing "uncomfortably little exag-
geration"11 in its description of the attorney who insists that his client
forego treatment and rehabilitation in order to preserve the injury in
its unhealed state until after the jury trial. Too frequently, Professor
O'Connell yields to the temptation to select colorful, but untypical,
examples of the inadequacies of the fault system. Although the practicing
trial lawyer recognizes the many abuses in the present system, he is
insulted intellectually by the author's repeated exaggerations of such
practices. Although no fault proposals are nearly as old as the automobile
itself, the author, along with Professor Robert Keeton, deserves credit
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id. at 52.
7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 97.
9. Id. at 96-98.
10. Note, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 476 (1936).
11. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, sufpra note 1, at 17.
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for much of the current interest in no fault. One writer describes the
proponents' strategy:
Keeton and O'Connell are highly literate and articulate sales-
men for their proposal, writing books and articles and stumping
the nation in speaking engagements."
Professor O'Connell, however, cannot offer The Injury Industry as a
serious literary work. In light of its sensational expos6 of the present
system of automobile injury compensation, the book qualifies as a pop
publication effort.
Like most proposed plans of compensation, The Injury Industry
is neither all good nor all bad. The reader must applaud Professor
O'Connell's able refutation of the "God, Mother, Country" arguments
of those who would defend the present system. The ease of this self-
imposed task is indicated by the title of his chapter, "Defending the
Indefensible."'" Symptomatic of anti-no-fault rhetoric is a warning that
the no fault principle would result in dilution of "the religious belief that
each of us is responsible to his God for his own conduct." O'Connell
attributes this quote to the American Bar Association Section on
Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law. 4 In a similar vein, an
attorney implores his brethren, "Gentlemen, I beg of you, don't repeal the
Ten Commandments by enacting a no-fault plan."' 5
To those of the bar who cling to the traditional approach of liability
based upon fault, the author answers that this principle has been steadily
eroded over since Brown v. Kendall,'6 most noticeably in the area of
products liability. To those who insist that the tortfeasor "answer for
his wrong," Professor O'Connell argues that requiring the tortfeasor's
insurance carrier to answer in money damages is "about as morally
effective as allowing people to hire substitutes to serve jail sentences."'"
The author also argues that denying a negligent driver equal compensa-
tion may penalize him tens of thousands of dollars in special damages
for a momentary lapse of attention, a harsh penalty indeed. In short,
Professor O'Connell asserts that the fault principle of injury compensa-
tion cannot be defended on moral, traditional or economic grounds.
12. W. RoxEs, No FAULT INsURANcE 18 (1971). This book contains a discussion
of over 35 plans, some of which have been adopted.
13. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 122.
14. Id. at 125.
15. Id.
16. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
17. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 130.
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The Injury Industry repeatedly challenges the reluctance of attorneys
to abandon the system based upon the fault principle:
Lawyers are opposed to no-fault insurance because they sense
that the need for lawyers will largely disappear in auto claims
under no-fault insurance. No-fault insurance has indeed been
called "no-lawyer insurance."18
While such reason for resistance has never been admitted by any re-
presentative group, one must suspect that the prospect of termination
of the lucrative automobile practice has influenced the thinking of those
whose practice is predominantly tied to automobile injury claims. One
less skeptical than Professor O'Connell, however, might recognize the
sincerity of the trial bar's argument that no system of compensation
should deny full payment to the severely injured victim who must face
a life of hardship and suffering. Plaintiffs' attorneys argue that pain
and suffering is as real a loss to the accident victim as his deprivation of
salary. The author feebly responds, however, that no payment should be
made for pain and suffering because the system cannot afford the cost.
In addition, O'Connell argues that such compensation promotes expensive
litigation over the just amount of recovery and is subject to abuse by the
unscrupulous claimant. He insists that the ideal system would limit
insurance payments to out-of-pocket loss not payable from any other
source.
1 9
The attack made on the "collateral source rule"2 is particularly
pointed but perhaps, well deserved. It is not uncommon for a traffic
victim, under our present system, to collect the full amount of his
medical expenses from three different sources-his group insurance
policy, the medical payments provision of his automobile policy and his
jury verdict or settlement. The rationale of the rule is that a wrongdoer
ought not to be relieved of payment by the innocent victim's own prior
establishment of other financial sources. The staggering cost of the
duplication of such reimbursements is unjustifiable in light of the in-
adequacies of compensatory payment to all traffic victims. Therefore,
the author's proposed plan would provide coverage only for the amount
of loss exceeding all other available sources of reimbursement. 'Medical
expenses and lost wages would be paid only once, and not until sources
other than auto insurance are exhausted.2'
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id. at 29, 56, 97-104.
21. Id. at 115.
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The statistics cited in The Injury Industry are not persuasive of the
claim of "lower price--higher value." The author maintains that of the
44 cents of each premium dollar actually paid to the traffic victim, nearly
thirty cents represents payment for pain and suffering and for duplicate
payment of losses already compensated by collateral sources.22 Certainly,
the elimination of these rights of recovery will result in a cost savings.
Whether it would result in a "higher value," however, is questionable.
Minimizing legal expenses by eliminating the questions of fault and
pain and suffering would also result in a direct and obvious cost reduc-
tion. The significant question is whether these savings will permit the
system to provide benefits to the other 55 per cent of the traffic victims
who are presently uncompensated. Professor O'Connell appears to be
skeptical, admitting it is "less than clear" that a no fault system can
provide unlimited coverage for out-of-pocket losses at a cost acceptable
to the motoring public."3
After exposure to the vicious attack on the present tort system,
the reader is shocked to learn that the Keeton-O'Connell "Basic Pro-
tection Plan!" 4 is a compromise between the fault and the no fault
system."2 Unlike other proposed systems, the plan would provide for no
fault coverage for out-of-pocket losses only up to a limit of 10,000 dollars
and would also eliminate tort actions when special damages are within
that limit. The plan, which is not set forth in detail in the book, apparent-
ly preserves the tort action where damages for pain and suffering are
higher than 5,000 dollars and out-of-pocket damages exceed 10,000
dollars. Thus, the author cosponsors a plan which leaves largely intact
the present system he so vehemently criticizes.
Professor O'Connell does make a persuasive case for reform in our
system of compensation of traffic victims. It is reprehensible to deny
compensation to the maimed motorist for actual loss merely because he
was guilty of a momentary lapse of attention in his driving, while
grossly overpaying the faultless driver who has sustained only a minor
injury. Whether recovery for pain and suffering should be excluded or
limited, however, is a value judgment which must be made actuarily, once
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id. at 118-19.
24. R. KEErON & J. O'CoNxNLL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965).
25. The plan is described only generally in the text. For one explanation of how the
sponsors envision the plan would work, see MICHIGAN INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIm: THE KEETON-O'CoNNELL
PLAN AND ITS CRITICS (1967). For a discussion of over 35 adopted, or proposed,
plans, see RoxEs, supra note 4.
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it is determined how much the motoring public is willing to pay to operate
the system.
If one accepts the necessity for adoption of some no fault system,
there seems little justification for limiting the proposed reform to automo-
bile accident victims. Why not include those injured from other common
causes-the product injury, the slip-and-fall, the dog bite and the like
-which seem to account for a greater portion of the litigated cases each
year? The author reasons that "outside of automobile accidents we
don't have a legal and insurance system readily transposable to no-fault
insurance. '"28 One must question his determination to torture automobile
liability insurance into providing coverage presently available in health
and accident insurance policies. Of course, the author's compromise
plan must retain the liability policy to provide indemnification against
the tort suit still possible in all but the minor injury claims. In a true no
fault system, however, the automobile liability policy should cease to exist.
In recent years, the lawyer has been exposed to a barrage of
biased arguments opposing no fault compensation. The Injury Industry
exposes the affirmative arguments and responds to the opposition. While
the rhetorical overkill employed by Professor O'Connell disqualifies the
book as a scholarly work, its value lies in its articulation of the inade-
quacies of the tort system and the control exerted over it by the interest
groups who profit most from it.
LEONARD E. EILBACHERt
26. THE INJURY INDUSTRY, szpra note 1, at 145.
t Partner: Hunt, Suedhoff, Borror & Eilbacher, Fort Wayne. Member: Indiana
Bar.
Professor O'Connell's latest summary of the faults of auto liability
insurance is a welcome departure from the pedantry of other recent
studies. Hopefully, those political leaders and opinion makers who
found the prior studies excessively abstruse will read this more under-
standable presentation. If there is a single concept that those interested in
a better scheme of auto insurance should comprehend, it is Professor
O'Connell's description of the traditional system's operation. Explaining
that the fault system's basic difficulty is its need to establish "legal
liability," the author says:
The result is not a system for paying people automobile
accident insurance after automobile accidents, but a system
